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We Will Hand You No Line Before Its Time 
Frankly my dear, I don't like it! All of 
that lawyer advertising. Perhaps the law-
yers are not completely to blame. After 
Congress banned cigarette advertising in 
the electronic media,1 it was perhaps in-
evitable that the electronic media would 
turn to hemorrhoidal remedies, feminine 
hygiene products, veg-o-matics and fi-
nally to lawyers for their advertising rev-
enue. 
Whatever the cause, the good citizens 
of Baltimore have been subjected to a 
barrage of execrable television advertis-
ing by lawyers. First and foremost, there 
is that bearded fellow who often has si-
rens in the background and who advises 
us to drive carefully on holiday weekends. 
(To drive, perchance to crash, aye, there's 
the rub).2 Then there are those gentle-
men who want to help us across the board 
of "The Game of Law." How Baltic Ave-
nue! 
Let us not forget the former football be-
hemoth who, mercifully, does not confuse 
his commercials by referring to his coun-
sellor as "everything you ever wanted in 
a lawyer-and less." 
Of course, the blight is not confined to 
television. Tear sheets now appear on 
M.TA buses for the convenience of pas-
sengers. And remember, "If you've got a 
phone, you've got a lawyer!" 
Lawyer Advertising: Why it 
was prohibited, why it is 
permitted and why it is done. 
Perhaps the best thing that may be said 
about lawyer advertising is that, unlike 
acid rain or the gypsy moth, it can be 
stopped at the border. Last year the Su-
preme Court of Canada, in Attorney Gen-
eral of Canada v. Law Society of British 
Columbia,3 upheld the right of a provincial 
bar to prohibit lawyer advertiSing. The ad-
vertising involved in the disciplinary pro-
ceedings against the attorney was tame 
indeed. The lawyer's newpaper adver-
tisement, in addition to listing the prices 
of certain services and his office hours, 
recited the following: 
John A. Lynch, Jr. * 
DONALD E. JABOUR 
Barrister & Solicitor wishes to an-
nounce the opening of a new con-
cept of law office 
LEGAL SERVICES AT PRICES 
MIDDLE INCOME FAMILIES 
CAN AFFORD 
Buying or selling a home. Writing a 
Will. Motor vehicle accidents or of-
fenses. Landlord/tenant problems. 
Family matters. Incorporations. Es-
tates. Court appearances. 
These are the kinds of situations 
where middle income families need 
legal assistance. Now it is available 
at moderate costs with pre-set fees 
for many services.4 
Prior to the interlocutory appeals, the pro-
vincial bar had recommended suspen-
sion of the attorney for six months.s While 
the Canadian decision may indicate in an 
abstract way that the prohibition of lawyer 
advertising is not inherently incongruous 
in a western democracy with a tradition 
of free speech, our own Supreme Court, 
in the landmark decision of Bates v. State 
Bar of Arizona,6 saw the matter differ-
ently. The Canadian court implied that it, 
too, would have been unable to uphold a 
prohibition of lawyer advertising if the Ca-
nadian right to free speech were "en-
trenched beyond the reach of Parliament 
or legislature, as has been done for ex-
ample in the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution."7 
The author is not alone in finding most 
lawyer advertising noisome, crass and 
undignified. The Supreme Court of Ten-
nessee has held: 
We are not prepared to reject these 
time-honored traditions. The law is 
an ancient, honorable and learned 
profession and its practitioners are 
not tradesmen in the marketplace. 
The role of the huckster, the hawks-
ter and the peddler ill becomes a 
member of a dignified profession. s 
The Supreme Court in Bates held, ap-
propriately, that the interest of maintain-
ing the dignity of the legal profession pales 
beside the First Amendment interests, 
even as to legal advertising which in-
volves merely commercial rather than 
political or association overtones. 9 The 
Court held: "The listener's interest is 
substantial: the consumer's concern for 
the free flow of commercial speech often 
may be far keener than his concern for 
urgent political dialogue."1o The Court 
hinted that the bar's failure to advertise 
has hurt its image,11 and that resistance 
to advertiSing in the past appears to have 
stemmed from a stuffed-shirt sentiment 
that advertising would benefit only the 
wrong sorts of lawyers and clients. Per-
haps the classic example of this stuffed-
shirt mentality was expressed by Henry 
Drinker in his classic work on professional 
ethics: 
While extensive advertising would 
doubtlessly increase litigation, this has 
always been considered as against 
public policy. Also, many of the most 
desirable clients, imbued with high 
respect for their lawyer and his call-
ing, would have no use for a lawyer 
who does not maintain the dignity and 
standards of his profession and would 
instinctively resent any attempt by 
another lawyer to encroach on their 
relation (emphasis added).12 
There was perhaps a feeling that most of 
the good clients were already taken and 
that those who were not could find coun-
sel at their country clubs, thank you. Such 
pomposity was largely punctured by Bates. 
Reading Bates, one might get the 
impression that lawyer advertising is 
somehow in the public interest because 
it provides consumers with valuable in-
formation and takes the mystique out of 
choosing a lawyer. One can imagine that, 
for many persons, choosing a lawyer for 
the first time and being too embarrassed 
to ask when the "meter" will start to run 
is reminiscent of the scene in the "Sum-
mer of '42" in which the teenage boy in 
the drugstore tries to buy contraceptives 
for the first time. 
In addition to holding that lawyer ad-
vertising might do some good, the Court 
in Bates also held that: lawyer advertis-
ing was not inherently misleading; it would 
not adversely affect the administration of 
justice by stirring up litigation; it would not 
have an adverse effect on the price and 
quality of legal services; and deceptive 
advertising was preventable. 
At bottom, however, advertising usu-
ally does not stem from humanitarian mo-
tivations. The decision to advertise is an 
economic one. 13 A lawyer who advertises 
will want to do so effectively-in a man-
ner which brings clients into his office. 





vertise in a manner calculated to make 
the public remember his or her name when 
the services of a lawyer become neces-
sary. If advertising of products and other 
services is any indication, the slick and 
the .c~ever will predominate in legal ad-
vertising. If legal advertising on television 
is any indication, perhaps that day may 
not come too soon in the Baltimore area. 
But. s.logans which constitute good ad-
vertising may not constitute good reasons 
for choosing a lawyer. 
Perhaps recognizing this, the Supreme 
Court in Bates sharply limited the types 
of services, the advertising of which is 
afforded First Amendment protection: 
The only services that lend them-
selves to advertising are the routine 
ones: the uncontested divorce, the 
simple adoption, the uncontested 
personal bankruptcy, the change of 
name and the like .... 14 
Often such services do not "pay" unless 
performed in a setting which emphasizes 
mass-production and de-emphasizes 
lawyer-client contact. Such cases do not 
generally comprise the sort of practice 
that would motivate a person to go to law 
school; they are often the kinds of cases 
for which a law school graduate settles. 
The bar is stuffed to the gunwales with 
lawyers, many of whom must look to the 
other side of the tracks for clients. Bates 
clearly indicates the side of the tracks for 
which lawyer advertising is intended. 
Maryland Regulation of 
Lawyer Advertising 
Like it or not, lawyer adve1ising is con-
stitutionally protected and is here to stay. 
Not all lawyers will advertise, and most 
who do will do so in a dignified and re-
strained fashion in the print media. Rec-
ognizing that the legal profession, like all 
others, has its share of (to put it deli-
cately) sleazebags, the Supreme Court 
(not putting it exactly that way), held that 
the states may regulate lawyer advertis-
ing.15 The Court held in Bates that mis-
statements tolerated in other commercial 
a~vertising "may be found quite inappro-
priate in legal advertising."16 Thus, in le-
gal advertising, Joe Namath really does 
have to wear the panty hose. Quality-of-
service claims ("You always get your way 
at Budd and Beaujolais"), in-person so-
licitation and electronic-media advertising 
were areas singled out by the Court as 
appropriate subjects for restrictions. 
In response to Bates, the American Bar 
Association, in 1980, adopted a Model 
Code of Professional Responsibility which 
permits advertising in print media and on 
radio and television.17 The Model Code 
requires that the advertiSing be done in 
a "dignified manner."18 The Code lists 
twenty-five types of information which may 
11 
be pr?vided in the advertisement, most 
of which. relate to biographical data, type 
of practice, and the terms upon which 
servi~e~ ~ill be provided.19 With respect 
to soliCitatIOn as a form of advertisement 
or promotion, the Code, with limited ex-
ceptions, generally prohibits a lawyer from 
recommending his services to someone 
who has not sought his advice or from 
compensating anyone who has recom-
mended his employment to another. 20 
While Maryland has adopted limita-
tions on solicitation of clients which are 
virtually identical to those of the ABA Model 
Code,21 it has avoided the Model Code's 
specificity as to the manner and content 
of lawyer advertising. The Maryland Code 
of Professional Responsibility provides 
very simply that lawyer advertising shall 
not be deceptive or misleading.22 Mary-
land wisely eschewed the Model Code's 
cookbook approach to regulation of law-
yer advertising. Even though the Su-
preme Court purported to sanction some 
~egulation of lawyer advertising in Bates, 
It and other federal courts have struck 
down several state regulations since 
Bates. 23 It is probably impossible to de-
fine "routine" legal services, and Mary-
land has wisely avoided doing so. Even 
if legal services billed at fees exceeding 
$100 per hour may ever be called "rou-
tine," clients who can afford to pay such 
fees would not be attracted by television 
antics or neon signs. Lawyers capable of 
performing such services will not adver-
tise. Not all states have left the choice of 
advertising methods to the judgment of 
lawyers. For instance, New Jersey pro-
hibits advertising on television.24 Utah, ever 
the party-pooper, has proscribed the use 
of promotional items such as matchbooks 
and inscribed pens and pencils.25 Mary-
land'~ sole focus in regulating lawyer ad-
vertising IS the prevention of misleading 
the public. While this goal is commend-
able, Maryland's failure to regulate in any 
way the methods or the tone of advertis-
ing may be contrary to the interests of the 
public and of the bar. One can only hope 
that members of the bar will have the good 
sense not to use "sandwich-men," celeb-
rity clients, or the bosoms of Baltimore 
Street dancers to market their services. 
If any member does, and the advertising 
is not deceptive or misleading, there is 
nothing to stop him.26 Before discussing 
the problems which excesses in adver-
tising may cause for the public and the 
bar, it would be useful to examine Mary-
land's regulation of solicitation and ad-
vertising. 
Solicitation 
In-person solicitation presents the op-
portunity for the most egregious over-
reaching of members of the public by law-
12 
yers. Recognizing this, the Supreme Court 
in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,27 has 
permitted the states to proscribe in-per-
son solicitation for pecuniary gain. Ohr-
alik's wretched factual situation (which in-
cluded a hospital visit, the "signing up" 
of clients with adverse interests, and sur-
reptitious taping of the clients from under 
a rain coat) amply illustrates the justifi-
cation for curbing such solicitation, and 
Maryland wisely does so. Regulation of 
solicitation is relevant to advertising be-
cause carefully targeted mailed or hand-
distributed advertisements may be vir-
tually indistinguishable from informing a 
stranger that he has a legal problem and 
volunteering to represent him. The latter 
is not permissible under the Maryland 
Code of Professional Responsibility.28 Al-
though the Maryland rule against solici-
tation specifically provides that it does not 
preclude commercial advertising which is 
otherwise permissible,29 Maryland is quite 
likely to restrict written solicitation of in-
dividuals under the guise of advertising. 
Courts in other states have grappled 
with the problem of carefully targeted ad-
vertising. In Koffler v. Joint Bar Ass'n,30 
the Court of Appeals of New York, holding 
that the invasion of privacy and over-
bearing persuasion of in-person solicita-
tion were not present, permitted direct mail 
solicitation of clients. Nevertheless, be-
cause of potential conflicts of interest, the 
same court, in Greene v. Grievance 
Committee,31 later upheld prohibition of 
such solicitation through third parties. 
Cogently, the Supreme Court of Florida 
recognized the obvious in prohibiting di-
rect mail solicitation: 
We do not perceive that a citizen re-
ceiving a letter written on stationery 
carrying an attorney's letterhead 
wou[d be bold enough to discard it 
after only a casual perusal. Read it 
he must, for letters from attorneys 
carry a special aura of respect be-
cause of the state's power that at-
torneys can invoke.32 
Although the prohibition was subse-
quently vacated, the principle remains 
correct. A written "advertisement," tar-
geted to a susceptible individual who has 
not expressed a desire to retain the at-
torney who has issued the advertisement, 
possesses the potential for overreaching 
the addressee. 
The Committee on Ethics of the Mary-
land State Bar Association has ad-
dressed the problems of solicitation 
through advertising in several informal 
opinions. In a lengthy informal opinion, 
the committee has recognized that mailed 
communications present the possibility for 
abuse.33 Nevertheless, the opinion per-
mits mailing to individuals and organi-
zations "chosen on the basis of geo-
graphic or demographic characteristics" 
or to groups of people whose character-
istics suggest that they may be likely to 
need certain broad categories of legal 
services.34 An earlier informal opinion, 
however, held that lawyers could not pass 
out their own brochures door-to-door.35 
Opinion 81-21 states that lawyers may 
hand out their own brochures as long as 
they state that the brochures are infor-
mational only. The Committee has held 
that a prepaid legal services program may 
not use a paid salesperson.36In two opin-
ions which are difficult to reconcile, the 
Committee held that a lawyer admitted in 
Maryland and a neighboring jurisdiction 
could not mail solicitations to Maryland 
residents charged with traffic violations in 
the neighboring jurisdiction,37 but that an-
other lawyer could send residents of a 
housing development which was being 
converted to condominiums a letter in-
forming them that he does real estate 
closings.38 Although the Committee held 
that it was not improper for a law firm, on 
the reverse side of its business card, to 
disperse advice in the area of workers' 
compensation law, it suggested that the 
firm might be precluded from represent-
ing persons who received such advice.39 
Unfortunately, it is possible that Mary-
land lawyers generally will not have a clear 
idea as to what sort of advertising or pro-
motion constitutes impermissible solici-
tation until specific disciplinary proceed-
ings reach the courts. Nevertheless, it is 
important to recognize that artfully tar-
geted mailings may possess the potential 
for the unfair exertion of an attorney's po-
sition over the public which, after all, is 
what the prohibition against solicitation is 
designed to prevent. 
Misleading and Deceptive Advertising 
As indicated earlier, Bates permits closer 
scrutinizing of the truth of claims in legal 
advertising than in advertising generally. 
On at least two occasions, the Committee 
on Ethics of the Maryland State Bar As-
sociation has indicated that this will be 
the rule in Maryland.40 Auto makers and 
the producers of products, such as Ger-
itol, have experienced counsel, trade as-
sociations and many years of court and 
regulatory battles to tell them what is mis-
leading in their contexts. Lawyers are 
simply told that they must be more Cath-
olic than the Pope about their advertising 
claims. 
A few legal truth-in-advertising cases 
have reached the courts and perhaps they 
provide some guidance for would-be law-
yer advertisers. In Eaton v. Supreme Court 
of Arkansas,41 the Supreme Court of Ar-
kansas upheld the issuance of a private 
reprimand to a lawyer who had placed an 
advertisement in a mailed package which 
included, inter alia, a "coupon for french 
fries with the purchase of a hamburger 
... a discount from a 'Figure Salon and 
Health Spa' on a one month membership 
... [and] a special on seamless gutter-
ing."42 Although the lawyer's advertise-
ment offered no discount, the envelope 
read: 
VALUABLE COUPONS from 
local businesses 
Save! Save! Save! 
USE THESE43 
The court regarded the advertisement as 
misleading and uninformative. 
In Roemer v. Albany County Bar 
Ass'n. ,44 the lawyers advertised that they 
provided a wide range of legal services 
at one-third to one-half less than the cur-
rent rates for legal fees in Albany County. 
The problem was that there were no such 
ascertainable "current" rates for legal. 
services. The court held that no action 
should be taken against the lawyers be-
cause they were ignorant of the contents 
of the circular. Presumably, such a de-
fense would be unavailing in Maryland.45 
In Zimmerman v. Office of Grievance 
Committees,46 the court ordered censure 
of an attorney because of his advertising. 
The Yellow Pages of his local telephone 
directory divided the practice of law into 
twenty-five areas. He had himself listed 
in all twenty-five, although he had had no 
experience in several areas. In exotic 
specialties such as admiralty, antitrust and 
trade regulation, immigration and natu-
ralization, juvenile law, labor law, secu-
rities law and taxation, he was the only 
lawyer listed. Further, the lawyer had 
himself listed under his first name, Aaron, 
rather than his last name, Zimmerman, 
which caused him to be listed first in every 
category. The court refused to accept the 
lawyer's explanation that he was asso-
ciated with a firm, the members of which 
could assist him in all of his purported 
areas of practice, since the lawyer was 
holding himself out to the public and not 
the firm. 
In State ex reI. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n. 
v. Schaffer,47 the Supreme Court of Okla-
homa dismissed a disciplinary proceed-
ing against a lawyer who advertised that 
he would file court papers or otherwise 
begin the performance of legal services 
on behalf of clients within five days of the 
initial conference or such services would 
be performed at no charge. The court held: 
The state surely has no demonstra-
ble interest in suppressing delivery 
of free legal service or in discour-
aging expeditious lawyer perform-
ance.48 
As with the question of solicitation, the 
Maryland Bar has grappled with the issue 
of truth in advertising informally for the 
most part.49 The Committee on Ethics has 
tentatively concluded that the listing of a 
lawyer in a directory intended for circu-
lation entitled The Best Lawyers in Amer-
ica is "likely to be misleading," but that a 
lawyer does not run afoul of DR 2-101 
as long as he or she does not actively 
participate in having his or her name 
listed.50 The Committee held that adver-
tising oneself as "First on the Maryland 
Bar Exam" could conceivably be mis-
leading in the absence of a date of the 
examination51 and that advertising at all 
in the county telephone directory might 
be misleading if the attorney does not have 
a regular office in that county.52 
A recurrent question with respect to truth 
in advertising is the extent to which one 
may advertise the specific areas of the 
law in which he practices. It would not be 
unreasonable for a member of the public 
to regard such advertising as a claim to 
a specialty, and for the most part, the bar 
has no means of certifying specialists. It 
appears that the Committee on Ethics 
would not regard as misleading an ad-
vertisement that one practices more fre-
quently in one or more areas of the law.53 
It also appears that use of the term "spe-
cialist" would not be proscribed if one could 
demonstrate that the designation is truth-
ful. 54 
It is very clear that lawyers must ex-
amine the contents and context of their 
advertising. Maryland's Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility gives them little room 
for error; after all, lawyers are neophytes 
in the world of advertising. 
Special Problems of 
Advertising for the Legal 
Profession 
Legal advertising poses two distinct 
challenges to the legal profession: pre-
serving the nature of the attorney/client 
relationship, and preserving respect for 
the administration of justice. 
The Attorney/Client Relationship 
The advent of lawyer advertising means 
that an individual can choose his lawyer 
the same way he chooses his toothpaste. 
The individual is no longer limited to se-
lecting a fellow club or church member, 
lodge brother or second cousin. He may 
select someone who has simply caught 
his attention, a complete stranger. The 
interposition of paralegals and sophisti-
cated office equipment between the law-
yer and the client can insure that the law-
yer remains a complete stranger. Medical 
professionals have greatly depersonal-
ized the practice of medicine, and they 
have paid dearly for it in malpractice in-
surance premiums. Advertising is often 
part of a strategy which emphasizes mass 
production of "routine" services. A $195.00 
divorce is not usually routine to the party, 
however, and office procedures, such as 
the returning of client phone calls, should 
be designed with sensitivity. This is the 
rule for all types of law practice, but failure 
to follow it can cause particularly severe 
problems in a practice limited to "routine" 
legal services. 
Maintaining Respect for the 
Administration of Justice 
Maryland has not placed many restric-
tions on lawyer advertising. For the most 
part, the protection of the dignity of the 
practice of law has been placed into the 
hands of individual lawyers. In some in-
stances, it has not been placed into very 
good hands. Some legal advertising in 
Maryland already approaches the "Crazy 
Eddie" variety. If the public becomes im-
bued with the notion that the practice of 
law is just another carnival, its respect for 
the administration of justice will be im-
paired. 
Lawyers must also consider the effects 
of their advertising on persons who intend 
to become lawyers. Many come to law 
school with very high ideals and a sincere 
desire to serve the public interest. Many 
maintain this spirit. If they are bombarded 
with huckstering about "The Game of 
Law," they may decide that the law is not 
the game for them. 
Lawyers in Maryland have been given 
great freedom with respect to advertising. 
It can only be hoped that they will see it 
as in their own interests to exercise that 
freedom responsibly. 
* John A. Lynch is an Associate Professor of 
Law at the University of Baltimore School of 
Law. 
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